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Abstract  
Recent research on climate change, within the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, has shown 
the vulnerability of groundwater resources to climate change and variability. In Senegal, 
agriculture is among the most important users of groundwater resources, especially in the 
northern coastal area called ‘Niayes’ where farmers practice irrigated agriculture and use almost 
exclusively the quarternary sand aquifer for their irrigation needs during the dry season – which 
is the main growing period. However, in Senegal, irrigated agriculture, particularly that of 
horticultural crops, mostly grown in the Niayes, has attracted less research attention in terms of 
studies focused on climate change or variability, compared to staple-growing rainfed regions. 
In the Niayes region, farmers grow most of Senegal’s horticultural production. Combined with 
human use of water resources, climate variability may threaten future irrigation water 
availability in the area.  
This paper uses an integrated hydroeconomic model and a rainfall generator to evaluate the 
impact of rainfall variability on irrigation water availability and simulate its implications on 
producers’ responses and groundwater management policy measures.  
Results show that groundwater availability is diminishing over time, resulting in higher 
water table depth and smaller water withdrawals by farmers who will tend to decrease the area 
allocated to crops and favor the higher-valued crops. These trends are accelerated under a drier 
climate regime. A taxation policy to stabilize the aquifer would induce a reduction of the area 
under cultivation and have negative implications on revenues. Supply-side measures to enhance 
recharge may not be technically or financially feasible. This suggests that Senegal needs to 
develop groundwater management options that favor sustainable use of agricultural water 
resources without hindering national horticultural production.  
  
Key Words: Agriculture; irrigation; rainfall variability; hydro-economic modeling; 
groundwater management; Senegal. 
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INTRODUCTION 1 
Ground and surface water resources are vulnerable to climate change and variability as well 2 
as extreme events (Kumar, 2012; Booker, 1995; Tanaka et al., 2006; Bates et al., 2008 ; ...). In 3 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) groundwater constitutes an important source of consumptive water 4 
use in most countries. However, despite its importance and changing climate conditions in the 5 
region, there has been historically little interest in analyzing the impact of climate change and/or 6 
variability on groundwater availability (Taylor, Koussis and Tindimugaya, 2009). The 7 
conference on « Groundwater and climate in Africa »3 held in Kampala (Uganda) in June 2008 8 
has been the first one on these issues in Africa (Taylor, Koussis and Tindimugaya, 2009). Since 9 
then, there has been a growing number of scientific publications on interactions between 10 
groundwater and climate related changes (see Taylor, Koussis and Tindimugaya, 2009; Nyenje 11 
and Batelaan, 2009 for examples).  12 
Agriculture is one of the biggest users of groundwater resources along with domestic and 13 
industrial sectors. However, in SSA, climate related studies on groundwater resources have 14 
mostly focused on the resource (see examples in Hughes et al., 2015) and not sufficiently on 15 
the implications of climate shocks on agricultural production and producers’ responses. Most 16 
of the studies have focused on modeling hydrological aspects without an explicit integration of 17 
user behavior (e.g. Nyenje and Batelaan, 2009). Indeed, by considering water demand as a fixed 18 
amount, hydrological models fail to capture the economic value of water (see Harou et al., 19 
2009) and do not fully account for users’ response to groundwater availability under climate 20 
change and variability. On the other hand, studies focusing on climate impact on agriculture 21 
have extensively focused on rainfed agriculture (Roudier et al., 2011; Roudier, 2012; Jalloh et 22 
al., 2013; Sultan and Gaetani, 2016), mostly due to its widespread practice compared to 23 
irrigated agriculture that only constitutes less than 5% of arable land in SSA (Giordano, 2006). 24 
They have therefore not sufficiently studied the interactions between climate and irrigated 25 
agriculture.  26 
This situation is observed in West African countries like Senegal, where, almost all the 27 
studies on climate impact on agriculture have been oriented towards staple crops in rainfed 28 
regions (P Roudier et al., 2014; Sene, Diop, & Dieng, 2006) with a poor focus on irrigated crops 29 
like horticultural ones mostly grown in the coastal area called Niayes that represents one of the 30 
two main agroecological zones of irrigated agriculture in Senegal. In the Niayes, farmers almost 31 
exclusively use the quaternary sand aquifer for irrigation and are impacted by rainfall variability 32 
mainly through groundwater availability as shown by previous climate related studies in the 33 
region (Aguiar, Garneau, Lézine, & Maugis, 2010; Dasylva & Cosandey, 2005). Those 34 
hydrological and geographical researches have been interested in how past climate have 35 
affected the aquifer and generally point out a negative effect of climate on aquifer recharge and 36 
depth (Aguiar et al., 2010; Dasylva and Cosandey, 2005). However, little effort has been done 37 
towards assessing the future impact of rainfall variability on water resources in the area and 38 
how changes in physical variables might affect horticultural production, farmers’ revenues and 39 
their responses as well as the implications for groundwater management.  40 
This paper aims at filling this gap by developing an integrated hydroeconomic model 41 
(HEM) that allows to analyze the impact of climate variability on irrigation water availability 42 
and its implications on production and agricultural water management in the Niayes area of 43 
Senegal. The ability of integrated hydroeconomic models to do such analyses has been shown 44 
in Western countries (Medellín-Azuara, Howitt and Lund, 2010; Blanco-Gutiérrez, Varela-45 
Ortega and Purkey, 2013; Howitt et al., 2012; Varela-Ortega et al., 2016; Esteve et al., 2015; 46 
...) and some SSA countries (see You and Ringler, 2010; Robinson, Willenbockel and Strzepek, 47 
2012 for examples in Ethiopia). In West African countries such as Senegal, to date, there has 48 
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been no application of HEM to assess climate change or variability impact and adaptation on 49 
agricultural water resources despite their suitability for this type of analysis.  50 
The objectives of the paper are threefold : (1) to assess the effect of rainfall variability on 51 
aquifer levels; (2) to assess the implications on farmers’ water extractions and cropping pattern; 52 
(3) to analyze different water management instruments, namely, the imposition of a volumetric 53 
water tax (demand-side instrument).  54 
Our integrated hydroeconomic model is mostly composed of a hydroeconomic component 55 
representing aquifer dynamics and groundwater use behavior, a bioeconomic model to derive 56 
agricultural water demand reflecting the economic value of water. To this combination, we 57 
associate a stochastic annual rainfall generator.  58 
In the next section, we present the study area focusing on agricultural activities, the 59 
characteristics of the aquifer under study as well as the climate in the region. In section 3, we 60 
describe our methodology. Section 4 describes the data we used. Section 5 discusses key results 61 
and alternative policy interventions while discussing their implications. In section 6, we discuss 62 
the results in light with the body of literature on the issue. Lastly, section 7 concludes the paper 63 
and discusses research perspectives for better policy design based on identified limitations of 64 
the study.  65 
2. AGRICULTURE, GROUNDWATER AND CLIMATE IN THE NIAYES AREA 66 
The Niayes area is the coastal zone located in the North-West of Senegal riding between 67 
four administrative regions: Dakar, Thiès, Louga and Saint-Louis (see figure 1).  68 
Agriculture is the main economic activity with two growing seasons, the rainy season that 69 
goes from June to September with a minimum mean annual rainfalls of 138mm and a maximum 70 
of 599mm in the period 1970-2011 and the dry season from October to May. Due to low level 71 
of annual rainfalls, farmers specialize in irrigated agriculture during the dry season that is the 72 
main growing season4 during which are grown most of horticultural crops in Senegal. The 73 
Niayes is the main production area of horticultural crops with “half to two-thirds of the national 74 
production of fresh vegetables” (Fare et al., 2017). Irrigated area covers 10000ha (J. Faye, Ba, 75 
Dieye, & Dansoko, 2007) with around 10000 horticultural producers (Ministry of Agriculture 76 
and Rural Equipment, 2013). In the Niayes, farmers use the quaternary sand aquifer for 77 
irrigation needs, to which they access mostly through private wells (shallow wells, dugwells 78 
and increasingly tubewells) by manual or mechanical extraction (with motorized pumps)—79 
(Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Equipment, 2013). There is a small proportion of farmers 80 
(less than 3%) in the South of the Niayes that access water through the Senegalese water 81 
company (SONES). Therefore, water costs faced by the farmer mostly reflects the cost 82 
associated with water extraction which is the energy cost of pumping for farmers using 83 
mechanical extraction and investment cost for well construction. More details on agricultural 84 
activity in the area can be found in Fare et al., (2017) who did an extensive analysis of the 85 
agrarian system in the Niayes.  86 
Concerning water resources management, it is under the responsibility of the direction of 87 
management and planning of water resources (the DGPRE5) embodied in the  88 
Ministry of hydraulics and sanitation. To date, very little is known about the agricultural water 89 
withdrawals within the Niayes area given that the farmers’ private wells are currently neither 90 
subject to effective control from the DGPRE nor under any significant regime of community-91 
level water resource management (to the best of our knowledge). However, there does exist a 92 
water code designed in 1981 and according to which farmers extracting more than 5m3 of 93 
ground water per hour should pay for the water they use up to 12.12Fcfa per cubic meter. 94 
                                                 
4 Due to climate change and variability, the duration of the seasons may be variable. 
5 Direction de la gestion et de la planification des ressources en eau. 
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However, this pricing scheme has not been revised since 1980s. Therefore, the DGPRE is 95 
currently undertaking studies to review this water pricing scheme and explore new possibilities 96 
of water governance. We hope that this paper will contribute to their pricing analysis, as well 97 
as to the larger debate around the appropriate type of water resource management regime to 98 
impose on the region. 99 
The quaternary sand aquifer is an unconfined aquifer that covers a surface of 2300km2 100 
(Aguiar et al., 2010). It is mainly recharged by rainwater infiltration (Aguiar et al., 2010; 101 
Dasylva and Cosandey, 2005). However, since the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, rainfall 102 
levels have remained below the levels reached during wet periods (before 1970s). On average, 103 
rainfall has decreased from 500 mm in the 1932-1960 decades (Ndong, 1995) to 321.42 mm in 104 
the period 1970-1990 and 353.67 mm in the period 1990-2011. 105 
Therefore, if warming trends and (more importantly) lower rainfall levels persist, the 106 
groundwater recharge may decrease and lead to declines in the available stock of groundwater. 107 
This might be exacerbated by growing extractions due to predicted warmer temperatures (Jalloh 108 
et al., 2013) in Senegal that will tend to increase the evapotranspiration of crops and, therefore, 109 
induce greater demand for irrigation water. In addition, the aquifer is used by other actors like 110 
industries, the Senegalese Water Company6, the entity that extracts and distributes water to 111 
some industries and rural households via boreholes. This raises concerns about irrigation water 112 
availability under different climate outcomes and how the agricultural sector can cope with a 113 
degrading resource base that is the primary production factor for farmers in the Niayes region. 114 
 115 
Figure 1: The Niayes area of Senegal 116 
Source: Realized by Dieye (2018)7 117 
3. AN INTEGRATED HYDROECONOMIC MODEL TO ASSESS GROUNDWATER 118 
AVAILABILITY AND MANAGEMENT UNDER CLIMATE VARIABILITY 119 
 120 
There is an extensive literature on the theoretical framework of common pool resources 121 
(Burt, 1964, 1966, 1967; Kim et al., 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Koundouri, 2004). This has oriented 122 
                                                 
6 This usage is applicable to the period during which the primary data was collected (in 2014). However, there 
may have been changes since then and the company’s withdrawals may have diminished over time.  
7 Dieye is a geographer at the Senegalese Institute of Agricultural Research. 
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our understanding of the basic problem of agricultural groundwater use, before putting it within 123 
the specific context of the Niayes region of Senegal. Empirically, economic modeling of 124 
groundwater has been mainly done using integrated hydroeconomic models that are extensively 125 
reviewed in Harou et al. (2009). There is a growing number of empirical studies on water 126 
availability under climate change or variability and its implications on agriculture and water 127 
management that use integrated hydroeconomic models (Medellín-Azuara, Howitt and Lund, 128 
2010; Blanco-Gutiérrez, Varela-Ortega and Purkey, 2013; Howitt et al., 2012; Varela-Ortega 129 
et al., 2016; Esteve et al., 2015…). Based on this literature, we tailor the integrated 130 
hydroeconomic modeling framework in Msangi and Cline (2016) to our area of study and 131 
research objectives.  132 
Integrated HEM are of two types: holistic or modular (R. Brouwer & Hofkes, 2008). 133 
According to Brouwer and Hofkes (2008), the holistic approach consists of a single, integrated 134 
model which allows for direct interaction between components, whereas the modular or 135 
compartmentalized approach is comprised of stand-alone components which more loosely 136 
interact, with simulation outputs from one component providing the inputs for another one to 137 
use. In our case, unlike the holistic approach build in Msangi and Cline (2016), our integrated 138 
HEM follows a modular approach (see Brouwer and Hofkes (2008) for more details in modular 139 
and holistic approaches and Esteve et al.(2015) for an application of modular approaches) 140 
which is composed of two stand-alone models: a hydroeconomic model and a bioeconomic 141 
farm production model calibrated using the standard PMP approach (Howitt, 1995). These 142 
models, implemented in GAMS, are run separately but communicate via variable exchange 143 
with output variables from one model being input variables in another model as we will later 144 
explain it in detail. To this set of models we associate a stochastic rainfall generator inspired by 145 
Safouane et al. (2016). 146 
The farm production model is run first to obtain the per hectare irrigation water demand that 147 
reflects the implicit marginal value of water to the agricultural producer. This water demand 148 
function is then transformed into a measure of producer benefit which becomes part of the 149 
decision maker’s objective criterion within the hydroeconomic model. This latter directly 150 
captures the groundwater management decisions and outcomes by combining the economic 151 
benefit of water withdrawals (net of pumping costs) and the resulting aquifer dynamics from 152 
period-to-period. We can choose between alternative management regimes in which we can, in 153 
one case, account for just the immediate costs of pumping groundwater (the myopic case) or, 154 
alternatively, we can also take into account the implicit ‘social’ user cost of groundwater 155 
extraction, which captures the externalities a forward-looking decision-maker would consider 156 
in a dynamically optimal resource management regime. The simulations from this 157 
hydroeconomic model provides us with aggregate levels of water availability and farmers’ 158 
groundwater use (aquifer level and withdrawals) over time, for the entire irrigated area in the 159 
Niayes. Withdrawals are then re-scaled to per ha quantities and fed into the farm model to 160 
evaluate the impact of different water availability levels on farmers’ net revenue and their 161 
responses in terms cropping pattern. Finally, the solution of the (dynamically-optimal) resource 162 
problem defines the benchmark for economic efficiency that we will use as a basis for 163 
comparing alternative policy measures, in a later sub-section of the paper. The overall 164 
framework that we use to capture the key linkages between the different models is captured in 165 
Figure 2. In the following sub-sections, we describe the structure of the models and the results 166 
from our scenario-based simulations.  167 
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 168 
Figure 2: Model integration 169 
Source: Authors  170 
3.1. Hydro-economic modeling framework 171 
 172 
3.1.1. Aquifer dynamics and choice of a single reservoir  173 
In the Niayes area, we noticed spatial heterogeneity for parameters such as the infiltration 174 
rate of rainfalls and the depth of the water table. As in Msangi and Cline (2016), the ideal would 175 
be to divide the aquifer into several interconnected reservoirs to account for that heterogeneity. 176 
However, we do not have the necessary data to estimate the connection coefficients between 177 
sections of the aquifer nor do we have sufficient data on hydrological parameters such as 178 
infiltration rates for the entire area. For this reason, we are constrained to consider the aquifer 179 
as a single reservoir as illustrated in figure 3.  180 
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 181 
Figure 3: Aquifer dynamics 182 
Source: Authors  183 
We capture aquifer dynamics by considering inflows (recharge) and outflows (withdrawals 184 
from agricultural and non-agricultural users). Inflows are mainly represented by rainfalls for 185 
which only a share ∝ infiltrates the soil as recharge. Indeed, due to factors such as evaporation, 186 
soil characteristics, vegetation and others, not all the rain that falls goes to the aquifer. In 187 
addition to inflows from rainfalls, we consider inflows from irrigation water applied to crops 188 
which represents a share (β) of farmers’ withdrawals (𝑤௔௚). Therefore an outflow for irrigation 189 
needs of wୟ୥ will result in a return to the aquifer of βwୟ୥. However, this return rate is not 190 
available for our area of interest. Therefore, since studies have been undertaken to evaluate the 191 
infiltration rate of rainfall (Gaye, 1990; Faye, 1995; El Faid, 1999; Tine, 2004; Dasylva and 192 
Cosandey, 2005), we consider that the return to the aquifer β is equal to the infiltration rate ∝. 193 
Sensitivity analyses are conducted in this paper to see how our results vary according to some 194 
parameters, including the infiltration rate. Apart from agricultural withdrawals, we account for 195 
non-agricultural users’ (water company and rural populations through boreholes) water 196 
extractions (𝑤୒୭୬୅୥) for whom we do not consider any return to the aquifer as it is primarily 197 
for potable water supply in urban areas and for domestic water use in rural areas. We consider 198 
non-agricultural withdrawals as exogenous quantities in our model.  199 
The equation of motion that describes aquifer dynamics is written as follows: 200 
 201 
𝑥୲ାଵ =  𝑥୲ +
𝑤௔௚ ∗ 10ିସ
𝐴𝑠௬
−
∝ 𝑤௔௚ ∗ 10ିସ
𝐴𝑠௬
+
1
𝐴𝑠௬
𝑤ே௢௡஺௚ ∗ 10ିସ −
∝ P ∗ 10ିଷ
𝑠௬
 (1) 
 202 
Where 𝑥୲ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥୲ାଵ (in meters) correspond to the aquifer lift in the current and future periods 203 
respectively. 𝐴 is the area covered by the aquifer. In order to avoid inconsistencies in the units 204 
of the variables, we need to convert volumetric values (𝑤௔௚ and 𝑤ே௢௡஺௚) into consistent units 205 
of measure (i.e. meters) according to the following conversion rule: when we apply one 206 
millimeter of water to a surface, it covers 10-3 m3 /m2 (C. Brouwer, Goffeau, & Heibloem, 207 
1985). This means that each unit of m3/ha withdrawn from the aquifer leads to an increase of 208 
the aquifer lift of 10-4m. This explains the division of withdrawals by the total area of the aquifer 209 
and the multiplication by 10-4. We also multiply precipitation levels by 10ିଷ in order to convert 210 
millimeters into meters. 𝑠௬ is the specific yield, a coefficient that allows to account for the 211 
amount of water released from the aquifer (see Johnson (1967) for a formal definition of specific 212 
yield).  213 
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The economic benefits for groundwater can now be combined with the representation of 214 
aquifer dynamics, to give a complete framework for looking at the impact of (economically-215 
driven) groundwater extraction on the aquifer underlying the Niayes region. The overall 216 
optimization problem that determines withdrawals over time can be either myopic or forward-217 
looking in perspective, as we show in the following sub-sections. 218 
 219 
3.1.2. Myopic optimization 220 
As explained in the literature (Gisser & Sánchez, 1980; Griffin, 2006; Knapp & Olson, 221 
1995; Wang & Segarra, 2011), when it comes to economic modeling of groundwater, the 222 
myopic behavior is a situation in which each agent maximizes its own profit to choose the 223 
amount of water he/she withdraws without accounting for the availability of the resource in the 224 
future and regardless of what the other agents will do. The maximization program in equation 225 
(2) displays the myopic behavior in the case of one reservoir at the regional scale (the Niayes 226 
region): 227 
 228 
Max
௪ೌ೒,೟
൛ൣ𝜋൫𝑥௧ , 𝑤௔௚,௧൯ = 𝑆𝑖𝑟𝑟𝐵൫𝑤௔௚,௧൯ − 𝐶൫𝑤௔௚,௧, 𝑥௧൯൧ൟ      (2) 229 
S.t.  230 
𝑥୲ାଵ =  𝑥୲ + 10ିସ
((ଵି∝)௪ೌ೒,೟ା௪ಿ೚೙ಲ೒)
஺௦೤
− ∝୔౪ଵ଴
షయ
௦೤
          (3) 231 
Where t corresponds to one period that we consider equal to a year. 𝐵൫𝑤௔௚,௧൯ is the per 232 
hectare benefit from extracting 𝑤௔௚,௧  of water. 𝑆𝑖𝑟𝑟 is the total irrigated area in the Niayes.  233 
The empirically-derived demand for water D(𝝀௪௔௧௘௥) -- or, rather, its inverse 𝝀௪௔௧௘௥(𝑤) – 234 
is used to obtain the benefit function for groundwater withdrawals (i.e. 𝐵(𝑤) =235 
∫ 𝝀௪௔௧௘௥(𝑤)𝑑𝑤). The Lagrange multiplier 𝝀௪௔௧௘௥ represents a representative producer’s 236 
willingness to pay for one more unit of water which corresponds to the marginal profit resulting 237 
from using one more unit of water.  238 
𝐶൫𝑤௔௚,௧, 𝑥௧൯ = 𝑥௧ ∗ c ∗ 𝑤௔௚,௧  is the extraction cost of 𝑤௔௚,௧  of water                                (4) 239 
c is derived from the first-order condition of the maximization program: 240 
 241 
𝜕𝜋(𝑥, 𝑤) 𝜕𝑤⁄ = 𝑆𝑖𝑟𝑟 ∗ 𝜕𝐵(𝑤) 𝜕𝑤⁄ − 𝜕𝐶(𝑤, 𝑥) 𝜕𝑤⁄ = 0  𝑆𝑖𝑟𝑟 ∗ 𝜇𝑤ఏ − 𝑥 ∗ c = 0          242 
C = 𝑆𝑖𝑟𝑟 ∗ 𝜇𝑤ఏ 𝑥⁄                                                    (5) 243 
where 𝜇 and 𝜃 are respectively the  constant and the elasticity of the demand function.                                                                                                         244 
      We do not observe farmers’ withdrawals (𝑤௔௚). To estimate them, we consider the per 245 
hectare water  use in the farm model ∑ 𝑤௝௝ ∑ ∝௝௝⁄  (see data section for more information on the 246 
water use data by the representative farm) that we multiply by the total irrigated area in the 247 
Niayes (Sirr).  248 
𝑤௔௚ = 𝑆𝑖𝑟𝑟 ∗ ∑ 𝑤௝௝ ∑ ∝௝௝⁄ ==>  c =  𝑆𝑖𝑟𝑟 ∗
ఓ(ௌ௜௥௥∗∑ ௪ೕೕ ∑ ∝ೕೕൗ )ഇ
௫
                             (6) 249 
 250 
3.1.3. Dynamic optimization 251 
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In this case, the net present value of current and future net benefits from groundwater 252 
extraction are maximized at the regional level as in the following program:  253 
 254 
𝑉(𝑥) = Max
௪ೌ೒,೟
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ 𝜋൫𝑥௧ , 𝑤௔௚,௧൯ + δV(𝑥௧ାଵ)
𝑠. 𝑡.
𝑥୲ାଵ =  𝑥୲ + 10ିସ
((1 −∝)𝑤௔௚,௧ + 𝑤ே௢௡஺௚)
𝐴𝑠௬
−
∝ P୲ ∗ 10ିଷ
𝑠௬ ⎭
⎪
⎬
⎪
⎫
 
 
(7) 
 255 
Where, 𝛿 is the discount rate. The other terms of this maximization problem have the same 256 
meaning as in the myopic case. To solve this dynamic problem, we use a Chebychev polynomial 257 
to approximate the infinite-horizon, carry-over value function of the Bellman equation (Howitt, 258 
Msangi, Reynaud, & Knapp, 2002; Hubbard & Saglam, n.d.).    259 
 260 
3.2. The farm model to derive the demand for groundwater 261 
Different methods of deriving agricultural water demand exist as describes Graveline 262 
(2016) in his review on water programming models. In summary, econometric and 263 
programming methods are the most used to derive irrigation water demand by agricultural 264 
economists (Graveline, 2016). Econometric methods consist of establishing a relationship 265 
between observed water consumption and data on the perceived cost of water (Bontemps & 266 
Couture, 2002). In our case, we could not get accurate data on producers’ water consumption 267 
and, consequently, were compelled to use an alternative approach. Mathematical programming 268 
models capture the water usage behavior of a representative farmer maximizing his profit by 269 
making choices over the optimal combination of productivity-enhancing inputs – which include 270 
water. The profit depends on the cost of inputs and the revenues from production. Those 271 
revenues depend on i) crop yields represented by an explicit production function (Graveline, 272 
2016) depicting the yield response to water, ii) the area allocated to crops and iii) crop prices. 273 
Different types of production functions have been used to represent the yield-water relationship 274 
as summarized in Graveline (2016). In our model, the choice of a production function has been 275 
guided by the calibration process as we will explain later in this sub-section. 276 
Our farm model depicts a typical producer that maximizes its profit according to 277 
neoclassical microeconomic theory. In the context of the Niayes, we assume that a 278 
representative horticultural producer maximizes its profit 𝜋 from horticultural crops8 under 279 
resource (land, labor and water) availability constraints as shown in equations 8 to 13.  280 
Max
௭೔ೕ,ೢೕ ,௔ೕ
൛𝜋 = ∑ ൣ𝑎௝൫𝑦௝൫𝑤௝൯ ∗ 𝑝௝൯ −  ൫∑ 𝑧௜௝௜ ∗ 𝑐௜௝൯൧௝ ൟ                                                  (8) 281 
  282 
∑ 𝑎௝௝ ≤ 𝐴,   (𝜆௟௔௡ௗ )                                                         (9) 283 
∑ 𝑧௙௔௠௟௔௕௝௝ ≤ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑏,    ൫𝜆௙௔௠௟௔௕ ൯        (10) 284 
∑ 𝑧௣௔௜ௗ௟௔௕௝௝ ≤ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑙𝑎𝑏,         ൫𝜆௣௔௜ௗ௟௔௕ ൯      (11) 285 
 286 
 287 
∑ 𝑧௜௝௝ ≤ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖, 𝑖 ≠  (𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑗, 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑗, 𝑤),    (𝜆௜௡௣௨௧௦ )       (12) 288 
                                                 
8 Although most small-holder farmers in Senegal are typical of other farm households in developing countries 
that subsist partially (or wholly) on what they produce on-farm – the horticultural growers in the Niayes are 
more commercialized and profit-oriented. Therefore we assume separability between the consumption and 
production decisions in the output market, and focus on the production side of the farmer’s problem.  
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∑ 𝑤௝ ≤௝ 𝑤௔௚௧,     (𝜆௪௔௧௘௥)        (13) 289 
 290 
Where, 𝝅  is the profit of a representative producer ; 𝑗 represents crops (onion, carrot, cabbage, 291 
sweet pepper, eggplant, african eggplant, tomato); 𝑎௝  represents the area allocated to crop j ; 𝑦௝  292 
the production function of crop 𝑗 ; 𝑤௝  is the amount of water applied to crop 𝑗 ; 𝑝௝ is the price 293 
of crop 𝑗; 𝑖 is the index of inputs (mineral and organic fertilizer, pesticides, labor, water); 𝑧௜௝ 294 
represents the vector of input quantities; 𝑐௜௝ is the vector of unit input cost except water. Water 295 
cost is accounted for in the hydroeconomic model as we will explain below. 296 
𝐴, 𝑋 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑊correspond to the available quantities of key resources used in production. 297 
Equations (9) to (12) represent land availability constraint, family labor constraint, paid 298 
labor constraint, other inputs constraint (mineral and organic fertilizer, pesticides). Input 299 
constraints are split into labor constraint (10 & 11) and other inputs constraint (12). Constraint 300 
12 would apply to those inputs which are limited at the household/firm-level, such as labor – 301 
whereas other inputs can be purchased freely on the market without any explicit rationing. For 302 
family labor, it is considered as a resource available to the household which the farm does not 303 
pay for. Equation (13) represents a constraint on available water, meaning that applied water 304 
depends on available water ൫𝑊൯ from groundwater resources that correspond to farmers’ 305 
withdrawals. In Mathematical Programming approaches, water can be explicitly priced (on a 306 
volumetric basis) or else provisioned under a quantitative limit or at some extraction cost. The 307 
extraction cost of water, integrated in our hydroeconomic model, is the only water-related cost 308 
that we account for in the Niayes case as farmers mostly access water through private wells. 309 
We calibrated the model to observed data by using the standard PMP approach of (Howitt, 310 
1995). There is a comprehensive discussion on the standard PMP approach, its limitations and 311 
subsequent developments that include supply elasticities in the calibration process in Heckelei 312 
and Britz (2005) and Graveline (2016). In our case, the choice of the standard approach is 313 
justified by i) the lack of data on supply elasticities for the crops we consider. Concerning the 314 
yield function, we calibrated the model with a Mitscherlich-Baule specification as stated in 315 
Rosenzweig et al. (1999) who used the Mitscherlich-Baule relationship in the case of two 316 
inputs. In this paper, we use it for the single input case, i.e. water: 317 
𝑦௔ = 𝑦௠(1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝ିఉభ(ఉమାா்ೌ ))                  (14) 318 
 319 
where yୟ and y୫ correspond to observed and maximum yields; ETୟ corresponds to water 320 
applied to crops; βଶ is the soil residual water that we draw from the literature9 and βଵ is 321 
computed as follows:  322 
𝛽ଵ = − 
୪୬ (ଵି  ௬ೌ ௬೘⁄ )
ఉమାா்ೌ
                     (15) 323 
 324 
The presence of y୫ allows the input-yield relationship to respect the "plateau" feature of Von 325 
Liebig (Paris, 1992) – where a ‘ceiling’ on attainable yield is enforced, in accordance with 326 
agronomic reality. 327 
The Lagrangian is written: 328 
𝐿 = ∑ ൣ𝑎௝൫𝑦௝൫𝑤௝൯ ∗ 𝑝௝൯ −  ൫∑ 𝑧௜௝௜ ∗ 𝑐௜௝൯൧௝ − 𝜆௟௔௡ௗ൫∑ 𝑎௝௝ − 𝐴൯ −  𝜆௜ஷ௪௔௧௘௥൫∑ 𝑧௜௝௝ −329 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖൯ − 𝜆௪௔௧௘௥൫∑ 𝑤௝ −௝ 𝑊ഥ ൯                        (16) 330 
                                                 
9 See table B2 in the technical appendix. 
Page 11 
 
 331 
First order conditions related to water input is: 332 
𝝏𝑳 𝝏𝒘𝒋⁄ = 𝒂𝒋 ∗ 𝒑𝒋 ∗ 𝝏𝒚𝒋൫𝒘𝒋൯ 𝝏𝒘𝒋ൗ − 𝝀௪௔௧௘௥ = 𝟎 (17) 
 333 
To derive the implicit ‘demand’ for water – we successively change the available water  334 
(𝑊ഥ ) on the right-hand side of the water constraint, and observe how the shadow value of water 335 
(𝝀௪௔௧௘௥) changes. This is empirically consistent with taking the derivative of the profit function 336 
(π(p, c)) derived from the producer’s profit maximization problem, with respect to the input 337 
price of water (𝒄௪௔௧௘௥), in order to derive the input demand function, according to Hotelling’s 338 
lemma 𝐷(𝒄௪௔௧௘௥)=− 𝜕𝜋(𝑝, 𝒄௪௔௧௘௥) 𝜕𝒄௪௔௧௘௥⁄ . Given the fact that water is not priced on the 339 
market as other purchased inputs are, and that the value must be derived implicitly from the 340 
solution of the constrained producer’s overall optimization problem – our approach provides an 341 
empirically tractable way to obtain a demand for water that is consistent with the production 342 
technology and behavior that is observed in the data, and captured in our model. As Booker et 343 
al. (2012) describe in their overview of empirical methods for modeling water resource policy, 344 
this is a common approach when dealing with inputs not traded on markets, and whose use are 345 
observed as the result of management decisions, rather than being observed ex ante.  346 
The inverse of the demand function in FCFA/ha per m3 is written: 347 
 348 
 𝜆௪௔௧௘௥(𝑤) =  8196. 4𝑤ି଴.ସସଶ, so 𝜇 = 8196.4 and 𝜃 = −0.442                                         (18)                             349 
Therefore the benefit function is obtained as follow:  350 
 351 
𝐵(𝑤) = ∫ 𝜆௪௔௧௘௥(𝑤)𝑑𝑤          𝐵(𝑤) =
ఓ
ఏାଵ
𝑤ఏାଵ      (19) 352 
3.3. Simulated scenarios: rainfall scenarios and adaptation scenarios  353 
We simulated two categories of scenarios: rainfall variability scenarios and adaptation 354 
scenarios. The former are composed of a reference rainfall scenario, a dry rainfall scenario and 355 
a wet rainfall scenario. Simulated climate scenarios are integrated into the hydroeconomic 356 
model through the equation of motion (1) to capture climate variability effect. Since farmers 357 
exclusively irrigate during the dry season using the quaternary sand aquifer, we assume that 358 
horticultural production is affected by climate variability through water availability which is 359 
captured within the hydroeconomic model. The farm production model captures the response 360 
of farmers to changing water availability under climate variability.  361 
Adaptation scenarios are composed of i) autonomous adaptation defined by Leary (1999) 362 
as initiatives taken by private agents (here farmers) and ii) planned adaptation considered as 363 
policy-driven according to Smit et al (2001).  364 
Based on these two categories of scenarios, we defined three composite scenarios: 365 
a) A baseline scenario is composed of water availability (aquifer level) and groundwater use 366 
(withdrawals), land use and cropping pattern. This baseline scenario is simulated under the base 367 
rainfall scenario. 368 
b) An Autonomous adaptation scenario that represents farmers’ responses to water availability 369 
under climate variability. Farmers’ responses are measured in terms of groundwater use 370 
behavior (water withdrawals) and changes in cropping pattern. This autonomous adaptation 371 
scenario is simulated in combination with the baseline and planned adaptation scenarios under 372 
the dry and wet rainfall scenarios. 373 
c) A planned adaptation constitutes policy-driven water resources management scenarios. Here 374 
we tested an economic-oriented instrument: the introduction of a volumetric tax to motivate a 375 
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reasonable use of the resource. This planned adaptation scenario is simulated under the base 376 
rainfall scenario.  377 
In the following sub-sections, we will detail the methods used to build scenarios. 378 
3.3.1. Rainfall scenarios  379 
Inspired by Safouane et al. (2016), we developed a stochastic rainfall generator based on 380 
Markov chains by using historical data for the period 1970-2011. Our methodological approach 381 
can be declined in three steps as summarized in figure 4.  382 
The first step is to classify the year types using the standardized precipitation index (SPI) 383 
over 12 months (Mckee, Doesken, & Kleist, 1993) and rainfall data over the period 1970-2011. 384 
The advantage of using this index is its simplicity and the fact that it requires only rainfall data. 385 
We used the SPI program developed by the National Drought Mitigation Center10 for 386 
calculating the index. According to this index, the years are classified as extremely humid, very 387 
humid, moderately humid, close to normal, moderately dry, very dry, extremely dry. The 388 
second step consists of calculating the probability transition matrix that reflects the probabilities 389 
of moving from one year type to another based on a first order Markov chain. The third step 390 
consists of performing stochastic simulations using the probability transition matrix.  391 
Three scenarios are simulated over 42 years: i) a reference or base rainfall scenario which 392 
transition matrix is derived from historical data; ii) a dry scenario obtained by using the 393 
transition matrix of the base scenario with an increase of the transition probabilities of moving 394 
to dry years; iii) a wet scenario using the transition matrix of the base scenario with an increase 395 
in the transition probabilities of heading towards wet years. Although 42 years of rainfalls were 396 
simulated, we only do the analyses over a period of 10 years. Indeed, as suggested by Tanaka 397 
et al. (2006), long term studies should include changes in other variables such as population 398 
change. Simulation results as well as a comparison of statistical properties of simulated 399 
reference scenario and historical series are displayed in appendix C. 400 
 401 
 402 
Figure 4 : Steps for rainfall scenarios development 403 
Source: Authors  404 
 405 
                                                 
10 http://drought.unl.edu/MonitoringTools/DownloadableSPIProgram.aspx, accessed in March 2015.  
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3.3.2. Adaptation scenarios 406 
Autonomous adaptation scenarios are endogenously accounted for in the different models. 407 
Indeed, since the models are behavioral, we consider that when a shock is imposed on them, 408 
the observed changes reflect farmers’ responses to those shocks.  409 
As for planned adaptation scenarios, according to economic literature on groundwater 410 
management (Griffin, 2006; Msangi & Cline, 2016; OECD, 2015; Ostrom, 1990), there are 411 
different policy options (ranging from tax and quota policies to water markets and collective 412 
management) to improve water availability in the long run for different users. Those policy 413 
options can be undertaken on the demand side (extractions) or on the supply side (recharge) or 414 
both of them. On the demand side, we tested, as stated previously, a tax policy on producers' 415 
water extractions as they are the main users of the resource and discussed the other cited 416 
management options. To estimate the tax, we introduced a tax parameter in the profit function 417 
of the hydroeconomic model. We then simulated different levels of taxes until we found the 418 
minimal level of volumetric tax from which the resource stabilizes over time. The following 419 
equation (20) shows the profit function with the tax 𝜏:  420 
𝜋൫𝑥௧ , 𝑤௔௚,௧൯ = 𝑆𝑖𝑟𝑟𝐵൫𝑤௔௚,௧൯ − 𝐶൫𝑤௔௚,௧, 𝑥௧൯ − 𝜏𝑤௔௚,௧                                                  (20) 421 
 422 
As for the supply side measures, we did not test any specific measure. However, we 423 
computed the required annual additional recharge to stabilize the aquifer under the baseline 424 
scenario. The additional recharge was calculated by adding to the equation of motion (1) a 425 
“recharge” term that enables stabilization of the resource over time. We obtain the following 426 
equation: 427 
𝑥୲ାଵ =  𝑥୲ + 10ିସ
((ଵି∝)௪ೌ೒,೟ା௪ಿ೚೙ಲ೒)
஺௦೤
− ∝୔౪∗ଵ଴
షయ
௦೤
+ 𝑅𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒௧                                     (21) 428 
 429 
The resource stabilizes when: 430 
𝑥୲ାଵ =  𝑥୲,      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑡 ==> 𝑅𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒௧ =
∝୔౪∗ଵ଴షయ
௦೤
− 10ିସ ((ଵି∝)௪ೌ೒,೟ା௪ಿ೚೙ಲ೒)
஺௦೤
          (22) 431 
 432 
4. Data 433 
 434 
4.1. Farm model data: sampling, descriptive statistics and justification of the choice a 435 
representative farm  436 
4.1.1. Sampling 437 
Farm data was collected on a representative sample of 369 producers in the Niayes area in 438 
2014. Producers were selected based on a two-stage stratified random sampling with two 439 
sampling units: villages and producers. We first stratified the Niayes area into three sub-areas 440 
based on physical differences to ensure that the sample will reflect the distribution of farmers 441 
in the south, center and north of the Niayes area. Based on population data of the Niayes from 442 
the National Agency of Statistics and Demography for the year 2012, we computed the share 443 
of each strata in the total population. Using the sample size that was fixed to 40511 and the 444 
previously computed shares, we derived the size of each strata in the sample. We then sampled 445 
randomly 27 villages proportionally to the size of the strata. Finally, in each village, we sampled 446 
randomly 15 producers.   447 
                                                 
11 Note that the realities of the field combined with filling errors in the questionnaires brought us back to a database of 369 
producers. 
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4.1.2. Sample characteristics and choice of a representative farm 448 
The data mainly contains information on-farm activities (cultivated crops, inputs quantities 449 
and costs, revenues, labor) during the dry season and off-farm activities. The sample contains 450 
97.29% of men and 2.71% of women with an average size of 2.65 hectares. The total irrigated 451 
area of the sample represents 10% of the total 10,000 hectares irrigated area of the Niayes. The 452 
main activity is irrigated horticultural production with mostly vegetables.  453 
In the sample farmers are input-intensive with a broad use of mineral fertilizer (all farmers), 454 
organic fertilizer and pesticides. Labor is composed of family and paid labor that includes 455 
casual laborers and seasonal labor. The latter consists of “sourgas” hired on a seasonal basis 456 
and paid either by profit sharing, monthly or seasonally. Casual laborers constitute an additional 457 
source of labor that producers hire for specific farming operations (often plowing, harvesting 458 
and sometimes sowing). They are paid on a flat rate or daily basis. In this study, we consider 459 
only seasonal labor due to incorrectly measured data on casual labor.  460 
As for irrigation, farmers in the sample use the quaternary sand aquifer which they primarily 461 
access through private wells. Other irrigation water sources include access through the water 462 
company (SDE). Farmers using the water company are entirely located in the south of the 463 
Niayes area (in the regions of Dakar and Thiès). Farmers extract water manually or with 464 
motorized pumps. In the case of manual extraction, irrigation is done manually with buckets or 465 
watering cans while in the case of mechanical/motorized extraction, irrigation is manual or 466 
mechanic. In total, only 24% of the sample uses mechanical irrigation technics among which 467 
47% (which corresponds to 11% in the total sample) use drip irrigation, 5.62% use sprinkler 468 
irrigation (which corresponds to 1.5% in the total sample) and other technics that farmers did 469 
not report clearly. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the sample.  470 
Table 1: Characteristics of the sample 471 
 Farm characteristics Values 
La
nd
 u
se
 Average cultivated land per 
farm (hectares) 
2.65 (sd 2.7)* 
Cropping pattern (% of 
farmers cultivating the crop) 
Onion (78.32), cabbage (45.26), tomato (41.19), sweet pepper (26), 
carrot (24.12), african eggplant (22), eggplant (22), pepper (9.49), 
potato (7.32) 
 Share of area per crop over all 
area 
 
 Total area of the sample 
(hectares) 
1000  
In
pu
t a
nd
 
la
bo
r 
Percent of farmers with family 
labor (unpaid)  
96.48 
Percent of of farmers hiring 
paid labor (%) 
Seasonal labor (66.12), temporary daily labor (59) 
Percent of farmers using inputs 
(%) 
Mineral fertilizer (100), Organic fertilizer (88.88), pesticides (96.47) 
Ir
ri
ga
tio
n 
an
d 
ex
tr
ac
tio
n 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 
Irrigation water sources (% of 
farms in the sample) 
Dug wells (81.84), shallow wells12 (5.96), Tube wells (8.94), Water 
company (1.89), Others (3.52) 
Well lift (meters) Dug wells (8.04, sd 4.52) shallow wells (2.2, sd 0.70), Tube wells 
(10.38, sd 3.29) 
Water abstraction mode (% of 
farms in the sample) 
Manual (60.16), Motorized (33.06) with electric or fuel pumps, Mixed 
(6.78) 
Irrigation technologies (% of 
farms in the sample) 
Drip irrigation (11), sprinkler irrigation (1.5) 
Total observations 369 
*sd: standard deviation 472 
                                                 
12 Shallow wells are called « céane » in the Niayes and are considered as traditional shallow wells from which 
water can be abstracted manually using a bucket without any need to connect it to a rope (Cissé et al., 2001). 
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Source: Authors calculation 473 
 474 
Although farms could have different characteristics along the Niayes, the data constraints 475 
on physical parameters prevent us from developing different representative farms. Therefore, 476 
we mainly consider one representative farm of the Niayes for modeling purposes. For the 477 
representative farmer, we only consider crops that are cultivated by more than 10% of the 478 
sample (see table 1). As for inputs, for each crop, we only consider inputs that are used by more 479 
than 40% to 50% of the sample cultivating that crop. The same reasoning is applied to labor. 480 
We could not obtain field-data on irrigation water use for the yield function of the farm model. 481 
Therefore, we estimated it by using the Doorenbos and Kassam (1979) yield-water relationship 482 
displayed in equation 23: 483 
(1 − 𝑦௔ 𝑦௠⁄ ) = 𝑘௬(1 − 𝐸𝑇௔ 𝐸𝑇௠⁄ )                                                                                                   (23) 484 
Where, 𝑦௔ , 𝑦௠, 𝐸𝑇௔ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑇௠ have the same meaning as previously defined for the yield 485 
function. Based on this and knowing 𝑦௔, 𝑦௠ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑇௠ the quantity of water applied to each crop 486 
(𝐸𝑇௔) is obtained as follows : 487 
𝑬𝑻𝒂 =  𝑬𝒕𝒎 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝒚𝒎ି𝒚𝒂
𝒚𝒎∗𝒌𝒚
)                (24) 488 
Tables in appendix B1 indicate details on the data we used for the representative farmer and 489 
for the parameters in equation 24. 490 
4.2. Hydro-economic model data 491 
Hydroeconomic model data come from the literature and our own estimations. Data from 492 
the literature is mainly data on hydrologic parameters (infiltration rate and specific yields) in 493 
the area drawn mostly from doctoral theses undertaken by hydrologists and hydrogeologists 494 
(Gaye, 1990; Faye, 1995; El Faid, 1999; Tine, 2004). Data on groundwater withdrawals from 495 
the different agents, i.e. the Senegalese Water Company and rural borehole users, were obtained 496 
from the direction of hydraulics of the Ministry of Hydraulics and Sanitation and the Senegalese 497 
water company. As for farmers’ extractions, as detailed in the methodology section, they were 498 
estimated using the estimated farm total water use and first order conditions from the 499 
hydroeconomic model in the baseline scenario. Table B3 in appendix B summarizes the 500 
parameters and data used for the hydroeconomic model and their sources. Concerning data on 501 
aquifer lift, we consider the median value of all well-types lift (see table 2).   502 
Table 2: Aquifer lift data 503 
Well types Mean lift SD* Median 
Dug wells  8.04 4.52 7 
shallow wells 2.2 0.70 2 
Tube wells 10.38 3.29 12 
Ensemble 6.87 2.83 7 
*SD: standard deviation 504 
Source: Authors calculation 505 
 506 
4.3. Rainfall data 507 
We obtained rainfall data from the national meteorological agency of Senegal (ANACIM) 508 
for the period 1970 to 2011 for the weather stations located in regions of Dakar, Thiès, Louga 509 
and St-Louis.  510 
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  511 
5. RESULTS  512 
In this section we present our results on climate variability impacts and adaptation options 513 
on irrigated agriculture in the Niayes region of Senegal. The results are presented for five 514 
selected variables: aquifer lift, water withdrawals, land use and cropping pattern, farm income. 515 
The results for all these variables in the three defined scenarios (baseline, autonomous and 516 
planned adaptation scenarios) are summarized in table 6. Before presenting climate effect 517 
results, we found it important to first analyze the difference between the dynamic and myopic 518 
cases as we expose it in the following sub-section. 519 
5.1. Comparing dynamic and myopic case results under the baseline scenario  520 
We find that there is a small difference in aquifer levels and water withdrawals when 521 
moving from myopic to dynamic optimization cases although water availability is slightly 522 
increased in the latter case. Compared to the myopic case, there is only 0.09% average increase 523 
in the average cumulative present value of net benefits over the entire simulation period in the 524 
dynamic optimization case (from 93,032 thousand Fcfa13 in the myopic case to 93,115 thousand 525 
Fcfa in the dynamic case).  526 
Empirically, this small difference between the myopic and dynamic cases is known as the 527 
“Gisser and Sanchez” effect14 that has been subject to multiple critiques. Koundouri (2004) 528 
suggests that this result depends on simplistic model specification and parameters such as the 529 
infiltration rate, water demand elasticity. Its controversies were then supported by a number of 530 
subsequent studies that have further refined hydro-economic models by taking into account 531 
aspects such as environmental damage (e.g. Esteban and Albiac, 2011), by analyzing the 532 
functional forms of the cost and net benefit from water extraction (e.g. Tomini, 2014) or by 533 
integrating technological progress through endogenous irrigation techniques (Kim, Fuglie, 534 
Wallander, & Wechsler, 2015). However, in our case some of the issues raised in those studies 535 
could not be integrated due to scarce data that prevented us from integrating ecosystem-level 536 
linkages to the groundwater hydrological flows in the Niayes region. Also, we could not 537 
endogenize irrigation and water extraction techniques as the data allowing to do so was not 538 
contained in the dataset, mostly the costs and benefits that would support farmers’ decision to 539 
use such or such technology. The sensitivity analysis that we will perform will help us temper 540 
this limitation.  541 
Since the difference between the myopic and dynamic cases is not very important, the 542 
results will mainly be presented in the myopic case except for the autonomous and planned 543 
adaptation scenarios for which, results will be displayed for the dynamic case. The reason for 544 
this choice is that since farmers’ water extractions are lower in the dynamic case, we prefer 545 
using the latter to explore farmers’ responses in order to avoid any overestimation of simulated 546 
adaptation strategies. 547 
5.2. Impact of climate variability on groundwater availability: aquifer lift  548 
To analyze the effect of rainfall variability on water availability, we compare the aquifer 549 
level in the reference rainfall scenario to aquifer levels in alternative rainfall scenarios (dry and 550 
wet) for the myopic case. Our results show that the drier the rainfall scenario considered, the 551 
                                                 
13 1USD=~562 FCFA 
14 The “Gisser-Sanchez” effect refers to the conclusions reached by Gisser and Sanchez (1980) in their study of 
the Los Pecos basin, in which they stated that the gains to adopting centralized (optimal) management over 
myopic extraction of the groundwater resource were too small to justify any intervention.   
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greater the aquifer lift over the simulation period. Therefore, in a dry scenario, irrigation water 552 
availability is reduced and that effect is stronger when the drought is more severe. This is better 553 
illustrated in figure 5 that also shows that climate effect exacerbates over the years. Indeed, the 554 
difference in absolute value between the base scenario and alternative scenarios is on average 555 
0.02% in the beginning of the period from reference rainfall scenario to dry scenario 556 
(respectively 0.1% from reference rainfall scenario to wet scenario) and 0.4% at the end of the 557 
period from reference rainfall scenario to dry scenario (respectively 0.5% from reference 558 
rainfall scenario to wet scenario). This suggests that considering a longer period would have 559 
more stressed the effect of climate variability. Furthermore, we also observe an upward trend 560 
in the depth of the aquifer over the 10-year period in the base and alternative rainfall scenarios 561 
with an increase of aquifer depth of approximately 0.73 meters for the dry scenario and 0.66 562 
meters for the wet scenario compared to 0.69 meters for the reference scenario. Thus, 563 
withdrawals seem to exceed the rainfall recharge even with precipitation levels of about 500 564 
mm on average over 10 years. We found that on average 13 millions of cubic meters of annual 565 
recharge (in addition to recharge from rainfalls) is needed to stabilize the aquifer over the 566 
simulation period in the baseline scenario. 567 
 568 
 569 
Figure 5: Comparison of aquifer lift under myopic extraction (dry, base and wet scenarios) 570 
Source: Authors  571 
5.3. Impact of climate variability and adaptation on water use behavior, cropping pattern 572 
and farm income 573 
In the face of decreasing aquifer levels, farmers decrease their water extractions over the 574 
years (see figure 6) with a decrease of 6 millions of cubic meters in the baseline scenario, 6.3 575 
millions of cubic meters in the autonomous adaptation scenario with dry rainfalls and 5.8 576 
millions of cubic meters in the autonomous adaptation scenario with wet rainfalls. As with the 577 
depth of the water table, the difference (in absolute value) between the baseline scenario and 578 
the other scenarios increases over the years, about 0.04% in the first year from the reference 579 
scenario to the dry scenario (0.03% from the reference scenario to the wet scenario) and 1% in 580 
the last year for both scenarios. 581 
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 582 
Figure 6: Comparison of farmers withdrawals under myopic extraction (dry base and wet scenarios) 583 
Source: Authors  584 
 585 
Concerning land use and cropping pattern, results show that in general, as the resource gets 586 
scarce, it is optimal for famers to decrease the area allocated to crops with slightly larger 587 
decreases in the autonomous adaptation scenario under a drier rainfall regime. We find that the 588 
area allocated to crops decreases more for crops with greater water requirements and lower net 589 
returns like carrot compared to crops with higher net returns (even when they have high water 590 
requirements) as shown in table 4. This drop in acreage results in a decrease in net producer 591 
income with slight differences between scenarios (see table 6) over the 10-year period.  592 
These results suggest that the production of some horticultural crops (mostly low value 593 
crops) could be reduced in the long run under climate variability. Therefore, policies should 594 
incorporate better governance mechanisms for irrigation water resources to ensure their long-595 
term availability for sustainable horticultural production in the Niayes. They should also 596 
investigate the possibility to extend horticultural production in other areas to reduce the pressure 597 
on water resources in the Niayes.  598 
5.4. Agricultural water management options: tested planned adaptation  599 
We tried a taxation policy to motivate farmers to preserve the resource by imposing 600 
increasingly an ad valorem tax on producers’ water withdrawal. Taxes imposed vary between 601 
0 (without tax) and 0.14 FCFA per cubic meter withdrawn. We find that the higher the level of 602 
the tax, the lower the withdrawals and the lower the aquifer lift. The level of tax required to 603 
stabilize the aquifer over time is greater than 0.1 FCFA per cubic meter. However, that would 604 
lead to a substantial reduction in farmers’ withdrawals compared to the situation without tax. 605 
As a consequence, farmers would decrease the area allocated to crops. For some crops more 606 
than half of the initial area allocated is reduced as shown in table 4. This leads to a decrease in 607 
farmers’ income of around 83% as shown in table 6. 608 
 609 
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Table 3: Land use under different levels of water availability and under taxation 612 
Crops 
Simulated 
area  
(t=115) 
%change area allocation between t=1 
and t=10 in dynamic case without 
taxation 
%change area 
allocation 
between t=1 
and t=10 in 
dynamic case 
under taxation 
(tax=0.1fcf/m3) 
Per 
hectar 
net 
return 
(x105fc
fa/ha) 
Water 
requir
ements 
(mm/h
a) 
Base 
scenar
io 
(~340
,6mm/
an) 
Dry scenario 
(~187mm/an) 
Wet scenario 
(~507) 
mm/an) 
Onion 0.73 -18.59 -19.08 -17.84 -67.41 16.69 703.2 
Carrot 0.51 -50.67 -51.41 -49.50 -98.10 8.05 1650 
Cabbage 0.46 -3.05 -3.12 -2.95 -6.29 11.96 607.2 
Sweet 
pepper 
0.27 -5.44 -5.57 -5.25 -11.85 46.32 1201 
Eggplant 0.40 -17.76 -18.23 -17.04 -63.55 16.80 1125.8 
African 
eggplant 
0.41 -10.42 -10.67 -10.02 -26.20 23.28 1125.8 
Tomato 0.46 -2.26 -2.31 -2.18 -4.54 10.15 451.5 
Source: Authors  613 
 614 
Imposing such a tax requires having accurate information on the volume of groundwater 615 
being pumped by farmers, which is not yet well-documented for the Niayes area. It would also 616 
require that the revenue from the tax be redistributed to the farmers being charged in lump-sum, 617 
in order to maintain their overall welfare and to keep the policy revenue-neutral. The lack of 618 
information on producer’s pumping can prevent from imposing the right resource management 619 
strategy – including a quota on pumped water. Therefore, the first step towards management 620 
should include rigorous measurement of farmers’ withdrawals from the aquifer. More 621 
importantly, although being theoretically an option to manage groundwater resources, the 622 
application of a taxation policy on producers’ side can lead – in the long term – to a drastic 623 
decrease in horticultural production in the Niayes that supplies more than half of the local 624 
market in horticultural products. This would neither be favorable to producers nor in line with 625 
political ambitions in the horticultural sub-sector. Consequently, even though the resource 626 
should be preserved over time, such a measure should be undertaken only if it allows preserving 627 
the resource without offsetting farmers’ well-being. One of the venues would be to look for 628 
alternative production areas. It might even be better to look more broadly at overall water 629 
resource sustainability in Senegal (including surface water resources), and consider ways of 630 
sustainably exploiting available surface and groundwater to expand irrigation so that the 631 
country’s horticultural (and other non-horticultural) production needs can be maintained.  632 
                                                 
15 See calibration results in annex B to compare with observed values. 
Page 20 
 
Table 4 : Summary of results for the different scenarios and variables 633 
 634 
Source: Authors  635 
 636 
5.5. Sensitivity analysis 637 
In this section, we conduct a sensitivity analysis on three parameters of the hydroeconomic 638 
model: the infiltration rate, the discount factor, the elasticity of the demand function to see how 639 
our results on water availability would change as a result of a change in the value of those 640 
parameters. To avoid filling the paper with unnecessary figures and tables, for each parameter, 641 
we only report the changes we observe.  642 
Sensitivity analysis on rainwater infiltration rate has been done considering rates between 643 
0.4% and 20%. The analysis shows that higher infiltration rates imply a more available resource 644 
over time reflected by a lower aquifer lift and higher water withdrawals as shown in figures 7 645 
and 8. A higher infiltration rate also induces a higher difference in water availability between 646 
wetter and drier situations.  647 
 648 
Figure 7: Sensitivity analysis—Aquifer lift under different levels of infiltration rate in the myopic case and baseline 649 
scenario 650 
Source: Authors  651 
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 654 
Figure 8: Sensitivity analysis— producer withdrawals under different levels of infiltration rate in the myopic case and 655 
baseline scenario 656 
Source: Authors  657 
As for the discount factor, we run the model with lower interest rates ranging from 6.5% to 658 
2.5%; therefore, a higher discount factor ( ଵ
ଵା௜
). It is important to note that the myopic case is 659 
not affected by a change in the discount factor due to the fact that the future is not integrated in 660 
the myopic problem. We find that, farmers’ water extractions in the dynamic case are smaller 661 
in all periods with lower interest rates as shown in figure 13. Thus, the difference between 662 
myopic and dynamic cases becomes more important. This can be explained by the fact that the 663 
higher the discount factor, the higher the present value of future net revenues. As a result, 664 
farmers value the availability of the resource in the future and thus decrease their withdrawals 665 
in the dynamic case which improves the availability of the groundwater reflected in a lower 666 
aquifer lift with lower interest rates (see figure 9). We further find that changes in the discount 667 
factor do not affect significantly the difference in water availability between rainfall scenarios. 668 
 669 
Figure 9: Sensitivity analysis--Aquifer lift under different levels of interest rate in the myopic case and baseline scenario 670 
Source: Authors  671 
 672 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0.004 0.054 0.104 0.154 0.204
W
at
er
 W
ith
dr
aw
al
s i
n 
M
ill
io
ns
 o
f c
ub
ic
 
m
et
er
myopic (t=1)
myopic (t=2)
myopic (t=3)
myopic (t=4)
myopic (t=5)
myopic (t=6)
myopic (t=7)
myopic (t=8)
myopic (t=9)
myopic-(t=10)
6,6
6,8
7
7,2
7,4
7,6
7,8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Aq
ui
fe
r l
ift
 (m
et
er
s)
Years
Dynamic (i=0.025) Dynamic (i=0.035) Dynamic (i=0.045)
Dynamic (i=0.055) Dynamic (i=0.065)
Page 22 
 
 673 
Figure 2: Sensitivity analysis— producer withdrawals under different levels of interest rate in the dynamic case and 674 
baseline scenario 675 
Source: Authors  676 
Concerning the elasticity of the demand function, we imposed a lower elasticity of -0.15 677 
and a higher elasticity of -0.80. We note that the more the demand is inelastic (the elasticity 678 
tends to 0 in absolute value) the greater the difference between the withdrawals in the first and 679 
last years (the decreasing trend in water availability remains unchanged) as shown in table 7. 680 
Table 5: Water withdrawals under elastic and inelastic demand 681 
 
Water withdrawals with elastic demand 
(elasticity =-0.8) 
Water withdrawals with inelastic demand 
(elasticity =-0.15) 
Years Dynamic 
(x106 m3) 
Myopic 
(x106 m3) 
Dynamic 
(x106 m3) 
Myopic 
(x106 
m3) 
1 28.72 31.40 31.38 31.40 
2 28.32 30.89 28.81 28.83 
3 27.98 30.45 26.81 26.83 
4 27.64 30.01 25.06 25.08 
5 27.33 29.61 23.65 23.66 
6 27.00 29.20 22.28 22.29 
7 26.68 28.80 21.05 21.06 
8 26.38 28.43 20.02 20.03 
9 26.10 28.08 19.16 19.16 
10 25.83 27.75 18.37 18.38 
Difference -2.88 -3.65 -13.01 -13.02 
Source: Authors  682 
 683 
Overall, these sensitivity analyzes show that the choice of rainwater infiltration rate is an 684 
important element in analyzing the effect of rainfall variability on the availability of 685 
groundwater resources for irrigation in the Niayes. Indeed, the higher it is, the more the 686 
difference between rainfall scenarios is important. The other elements (discount factor and 687 
water demand elasticity) have a greater impact on producers' water withdrawal behavior and so 688 
affect the depth of the aquifer; however, they do not affect much the differences in water 689 
availability between rainfall scenarios nor the overall trend of results. These results confirm the 690 
critiques of simulation-based analyses put forward by Koundouri (2004). 691 
 692 
6. Discussion  693 
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 694 
6.1. Water availability under climate variability 695 
Our results on water availability under climate variability over time is consistent with earlier 696 
literature in the Niayes. Aguiar et al. (2010) studied the interannual past evolution of the 697 
quaternary sand aquifer between 1958 and 2002 and compared the evolution of aquifer levels 698 
during wet periods (1958-1970) and during dry periods (from 1972) in some localities of the 699 
Niayes. They found that the water table remained high during wet periods and observed the 700 
most significant drops in water table during the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s.  701 
Concerning the insufficient recharge, Dasylva and Cosandey (2005) analyzed the water 702 
budget of the quaternary sand aquifer in the south of the Niayes (Dakar) under different rainfall 703 
scenarios and showed that with a normal or deficit rainfall, the water balance is negative and 704 
only becomes positive from excess rainfall averaging 700 mm per year. Thus, they find that 705 
recharge from rainfalls is insufficient to ensure effective re-supply of the aquifer when annual 706 
precipitations are lower than their levels during wet periods (before 1970). In our case, we find 707 
that even in a wet scenario situation (about 507mm), the resource becomes more scarce over 708 
time. 709 
Regarding the magnitude of the increase of the aquifer lift over the ten years we simulated, 710 
Aguiar et al. (2010) found that over the period 1958-1994, the water table fell by nearly 0.51 711 
meters on average every 10 years. In the same way, our results show that the water table will 712 
continue to fall on average of the same amplitude or more depending on rainfall levels over a 713 
given 10-years period. This decrease of the water table could have implications on water 714 
quality. Indeed, with climate change, it is predicted on the coastal zone of Senegal a sea level 715 
rise of 20 cm by 2030 and 80 cm by 2080 compared to a rise of only 3 cm between 1990 and 716 
2010 (World Bank, 2014). An average continuous drop in the aquifer level of 0.60 meters 717 
(60cm) over 10 years increases the risk of saline intrusion that would be detrimental to 718 
horticultural production in the coastal Niayes.  719 
Also, increasing aquifer lift can have implications on irrigation technology use. Indeed, as 720 
argues Sekhri (2013, 2014) who studied water related issues in some Indian villages, as long as 721 
the depth of the groundwater is not greater than 8 meters below ground, water can be extracted  722 
using surface pumps. However when the depth is more than 8 meters from the surface, farmers 723 
need to use costlier submersible pumps for water extraction. 724 
 725 
6.2. Farmers response to water availability 726 
Results on farmers’ autonomous adaptation to decreasing water availability are somehow 727 
similar to other results in other contexts. We compare the results with studies in other contexts 728 
because adaptation to aquifer availability in the Niayes area has been poorly studied. In India, 729 
Sekhri (2013) analyzed the impact of a decline in groundwater and finds that a drop of one 730 
meter of the water table over a year causes a drop in production, especially for more water 731 
demanding crops. In the same way, in Spain, Esteve et al. (2015) used an integrated hydro-732 
economic model for surface water and found that when available water decreases in the face of 733 
climate change, producers change their cropping pattern and their income declines. Moreover, 734 
Heidecke (2010) showed that (by analyzing survey data) in Morocco, when there is water 735 
shortage due to groundwater decline, the main reaction of producers is to reduce the area under 736 
cultivation. 737 
It should be noted that the only strategies available for producers in our production model 738 
are the reduction in area under cultivation and the change in cropping pattern (among crops 739 
taken into account). These strategies, included here, assume that when water availability 740 
decreases, producers limit themselves to the amount of water available and adapt accordingly. 741 
For example a producer who grows one hectare of onion will not continue to cultivate one 742 
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hectare of onion when available water drops; but will cultivate an area that he/she can irrigate 743 
with available water. However, based on our field experiences and literature (Heidecke, 2010; 744 
Sekhri, 2014), in addition to strategies related to acreage decrease and changes in cropping 745 
pattern, producers can also adopt other strategies that enable them to extract more water by 746 
increasing their water pumping capacity and therefore continue to cultivate the same areas (or 747 
even more) than before climate shock. For instance, Heidecke (2010) finds that another 748 
producers’ reaction is to increase the use of the aquifer for irrigation reflected by the increase 749 
in the number of motor pumps and the drop in phreatic levels in the years of drought.  750 
 Currently, our model does not allow for such adaptation strategies that require the adoption 751 
of new water extraction technologies which can overestimate the impact on agricultural 752 
production. However, these strategies could negatively affect net income because they have 753 
implicit costs. This increasing cost will arise either from the increasing energy cost of pumping 754 
groundwater from a lower depth and/or from the fact that a falling groundwater table means 755 
that additional capital costs might need to be incurred in order to deepen the wells or to install 756 
higher capacity pumps to access the water. It is therefore difficult to conclusively state their 757 
possible impact on production without additional data on those costs. It should also be 758 
remembered that some strategies that improve water access could, in turn, negatively affect the 759 
groundwater resource and lead to increased water scarcity over time. Indeed, according to 760 
(Berbel, Calatrava, & Garrido, 2007), “Investment in irrigation technologies has ambiguous 761 
effects [...]. Negative effects result from the fact that changes in technology may induce new 762 
crop patterns and increase total water consumption”. Also, integrating technological progress 763 
would require allowing the possibility of endogenously adopting new extraction technologies 764 
before choosing the amount of water to be extracted (given the chosen technology) which 765 
induces a hydroeconomic model with two decision variables (technology adoption and water 766 
extraction levels). These methodological limitations will be addressed in future work.  767 
 768 
6.3. Planned adaptation results 769 
Results on water pricing management strategy can be compared to what has been found in 770 
the literature in other contexts. Indeed, (Aidam, 2015) did an analysis of the impact of price 771 
mechanisms on the water demand for farmers in Ghana and showed, using the example of large 772 
producers, that setting water prices leads to a decrease in the water consumption of producers 773 
who reduce the production of high water demanding crops to cultivate crops that require lower 774 
water consumption. This negatively affects producers' incomes. Also (Berbel & Gomez-Limon, 775 
2000) analyzed the impact of setting water prices in three irrigated areas in Spain. They found 776 
that water prices as the only instrument to control water use is not a valid instrument to reduce 777 
the demand for agricultural water in a significant way. Indeed, water consumption does not 778 
decrease until prices reach a level that significantly reduces producers’ income and labor use. 779 
They also found that, for the locations considered, when price mechanisms are used to reduce 780 
water consumption, a 40% reduction in producers’ income is required to drop water demand 781 
significantly which leads to a reduction in the number of crops. Finally, when water 782 
consumption decreases as a result of substituting high water demanding crops, there will be a 783 
decline in the utilization of the labor force at the farm level and at the processing industry level. 784 
These results are in line with what we found on taxation impact. However, in our results, 785 
the decrease in farmers’ income is higher as discussed in the results section. 786 
7. Conclusions and research agenda 787 
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This modeling framework is a first step towards a better representation of groundwater use 788 
in a context of climate variability and change and multiple usage of the quaternary sand aquifer 789 
in the Niayes area of Senegal where irrigated horticulture is the main agricultural activity.  790 
Modeling results show that under both myopic and forward-looking cases rainfall 791 
variability affects water availability in the Niayes area. In the period 2014-2023, under different 792 
rainfall scenarios, we found that the dryer the climate, the lower the groundwater table resulting 793 
in farmers reducing their water withdrawals. Results also highlight low net returns gains 794 
between myopic and dynamic optimization cases known as the Gisser and Sanchez effect which 795 
could be explained here by the structure of the model that treats the groundwater underlying the 796 
Niayes region as belonging to one big reservoir, rather than several connected ‘compartments’. 797 
Also, we consider non-agricultural users’ withdrawals exogenous which led us to only account 798 
for on-farm benefits while there are also off-farm benefits that a social planner would consider. 799 
Therefore, further developments should be performed to accurately endogenize non agricultural 800 
users’ behavior to see how it affects results. Also, as develops Koundouri (2004), the choice of 801 
parameters such as the elasticity of water demand, the infiltration rate is important in model 802 
design. Moreover, as suggests Esteban and Albiac (2011), there might exist ecological and 803 
environmental aspects that also affect groundwater availability that we are missing within our 804 
model specifications. We also found that the resource is being depleted over time, in all climate 805 
scenario considered (even though the effect is stronger in dryer scenarios) and whatever the 806 
degree of myopia or foresight exercised by the decision-maker. This shows that rainfall 807 
recharge does not cover water extractions that mostly come from farmers. Our model shows 808 
that an average additional annul recharge of 13 million cubic meters is required to stabilize the 809 
aquifer over the 10 years simulation period. 810 
We further found that as a response to decreasing resource availability over time, in all the 811 
scenarios considered, it is optimal for farmers to decrease the area allocated to crops by the end 812 
of the considered period. Greater decreases of area are noted in a drought situation. Also, crops 813 
with low returns and high water requirements are subject to greater area decreases. Therefore, 814 
resource depletion might lead to significant decrease in irrigated area over time – either due to 815 
the effect on pumping costs and accessibility or through the effects of saline intrusion into the 816 
aquifer – which would threaten long-term horticultural production sustainability in the Niayes.  817 
To ensure sustainability of the resource, we tested a demand-side instrument, i.e. a 818 
volumetric tax, as a resource management policy measure and found that the minimal level of 819 
tax per cubic meter withdrawn required to stabilize the aquifer over time is 0.1fcfa. However, 820 
such a taxation measure would lead to a drastic decrease of farmers’ withdrawals, area allocated 821 
to crops and income. Ensuring resource sustainability being as important as meeting demand 822 
on horticultural products, a tax on producers’ side should be carefully investigated so as to avoid 823 
a drastic decrease in production in the long-run.  824 
Different alternative demand options (a quota, water markets, collective action) and supply 825 
side measures that we did not test exist. A quota-based policy would lead to the same results (if 826 
successfully implemented) as the tax in terms of water extraction decreases. We did not test it 827 
– recognizing that, as a tax, it would be difficult to administer in this region. However, it should 828 
be noted that a quota may have less negative effects on producers' incomes. In addition, 829 
empirical studies have shown that a tax could lead to more reluctance from producers than a 830 
quota (Montginoul & Rinaudo, 2009). Concerning water markets, they are feasible when users 831 
have well-defined property rights (Griffin, 2006) that they can exchange in a market. This type 832 
of solution could also be difficult to generalize in the Niayes context, given the type of 833 
management institutions that currently exist, and the absence of efficient mechanisms for the 834 
producers to communicate their willingness to buy and sell water. As for the possibility of 835 
engaging in the collective management of groundwater, we cannot test it here because it 836 
requires taking into account the characteristics and interactions between all the stakeholders 837 
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and illustrating the bargaining possibilities that might lead to a collectively cooperative 838 
outcome. Recent work in India by Meinzen-dick et al. (2017) describes the applications of 839 
experimental games to explore the willingness to engage in collective action with regards to the 840 
groundwater resource, and the effect that increasing awareness of pumping externalities on the 841 
part of the players has on this willingness-to-engage. Such an approach would be useful in 842 
exploring the potential for organizing such an institutional framework in the context of the 843 
Niayes, and will be considered for future work. In the methodological approach chosen here, 844 
we treat the institutions as exogenous and focus on the dynamics of depletion and the 845 
implications that it has on the agricultural economy.  846 
Supply-side measures (like rainwater harvesting for aquifer recharge enhancement) can be 847 
alternatives to demand-side measures or complement them. However, the difficulty that can be 848 
encountered is related to the high investment costs and their affordability. Most likely, external 849 
development aid and lending would have to be mobilized for this kind of scheme, and should 850 
be part of the discussions with external donors on Senegal’s overall investment strategy for the 851 
irrigation sector.    852 
Finally, we noted several model limitations that included the non-integration of 853 
technological progress (i.e. making irrigation and extraction technologies endogenous), which 854 
prevented us from accounting for a broader range of adaptation strategies. However, these are 855 
currently being investigated through a mixed-method approach (quantitative and qualitative 856 
tools) through the use of forum-theatre that enables us to engage more dialogue with farmers 857 
and enhance management options. Nonetheless, the modeling framework and the findings from 858 
this study provide a basis for further research on climate impact on irrigation water availability 859 
and agricultural water management in West African agriculture. 860 
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 1105 
TECHNICAL APPENDIX 1106 
In this technical appendix, we explain in more detail (for the benefit of the reviewers and the 1107 
interested readers) the specification of several key parts of the analytical framework – namely: 1108 
a) The method for approximating the infinite-horizon, carry-over value function for the 1109 
dynamic programming problem; 1110 
b) Information on the data and the calibration of the farm model;  1111 
c) Comparison of simulated and observed rainfalls 1112 
 1113 
A. Complementary methodological material 1114 
A1. Approximating the value function  1115 
 1116 
To estimate the carry-over value function that defines the infinite-horizon dynamic 1117 
programming resource management problem, we employ an approximation technique using an 1118 
n-degree Chebychev polynomial. Such ‘projection methods’ for solving dynamic programming 1119 
problems are described in (Judd, 1998).  1120 
There are a number of alternative approaches to numerically approximating the carry-over value 1121 
function 𝑉(𝑥௧)16 that is used to solve the infinite-horizon DP problem (as described in Judd 1122 
(1998)). In our paper we use a numerical approximation method that uses a nth order Chebychev 1123 
polynomial – which is one of several possible ‘orthogonal polynomial’ approximations that can 1124 
be used (Judd, 1998).  1125 
In this approach, the function is evaluated over the domain of possible values that the state 1126 
variable can attain, and is numerically computed at specific ‘nodes’ within the domain – whose 1127 
number define the order of the polynomial approximation. These Chebychev nodes provide the 1128 
points from which the numerical value of carry-over into the next period of the dynamic 1129 
programming problem can be interpolated to cover the entire domain of the value function. The 1130 
number of nodes of approximation can be increased to any desired number in order to improve 1131 
the numerical ‘fit’ of the value function – but at the cost of additional computational burden.  1132 
This is described further in (Howitt et al., 2002).  1133 
                                                 
16 Hubbard et Saglam (sd.) 
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— Chebychev nodes 1134 
For m nodes, the kth node of the Chebychev function is written as: 𝑧௞ = − 𝑐𝑜𝑠 (𝜋(2𝑘 −1135 
 1)/2 𝑚), k = 1, ..., m, 𝑚 ≥  𝑛 + 1. 1136 
 𝑧௞ falls within the closed interval [-1 , 1]. 1137 
We note that the values of the state variable do not necessarily fall within this restricted interval 1138 
– but lie within a more general range of values [a , b] where a and b represent, respectively the 1139 
minimum and maximum values of the state variable 1140 
The mapping of the nodes of the Chebychev polynomial ( kx ) from the interval [a,b] onto the 1141 
[-1,+1] domain is done with this relationship :                                                                                1142 
𝑧௞  =
ଶ(௫ೖି௔)
௕ ି ௔
− 1  1143 
— The Chebychev polynomial terms 1144 
After having defined the nodes of the Chebychev polynomial, we then approximate the value 1145 
function at defined nodes over the domain of the state variable, with the polynomial function, 1146 
which is defined as : 𝑉(𝑥) = ∑ 𝑎௜Ф୧ (x)௜  1147 
where 1148 
ai is the coefficient of the  ith Chebychev polynomial term  1149 
the polynomial terms can be written as: Ф୬  (𝑥)  =  𝑐𝑜𝑠 (𝑛 ∗ cosିଵ(𝑥)) 1150 
Using a recursive scheme, we can write out the terms of the Chebychev polynomial as: 1151 
Ф଴  (𝑥)  =  1  1152 
Фଵ  (𝑥)  =  𝑥  1153 
Фଷ  (𝑥)  =  2 ∗ 𝑥 Фଶ  (𝑥)  −  Фଵ  (𝑥) 1154 
          1155 
Ф୬  (𝑥)  =  2 ∗ 𝑥 Ф୬ିଵ (𝑥)  −  Ф୬ିଶ  (𝑥)   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠  1156 
 1157 
Over the interval  [− 𝑎 , 𝑏],  𝑎௜ = 
∑ ௏(௫ೖ)Ф౟ (୸ౡ)೙ೖసభ
∑ Ф౟ (୸ౡ)Ф౟ (୸ౡ)೙ೖసభ
 1158 
                                                       𝑉(𝑥) = ∑ 𝑎௜Ф୧ (2
୶ିୟ
ୠିୟ
−  1)௜   1159 
Value function iteration                          1160 
Following this approach, we can solve the Bellman equation of the infinite-horizon dynamic 1161 
programming problem by taking the following steps: 1162 
i) Give an initial estimate of the carry-over value function that is defined on the right-hand side 1163 
of the Bellman equation for the DP problem  1164 
 1165 
ii) Calculate the left-hand side value of the Bellman equation using the mapping relationship  1166 
𝑇𝑉 (𝑥௞) =  𝑓(𝑥௞, 𝑐௞) +  ß ∑ 𝑉 (𝑥௞)௝    which depends upon the intial ‘guess’ of the carry over 1167 
value V(x) that was done in the first step and the optimal value of the benefit function for the 1168 
DP problem. This gives you a new value for V(x) using the contraction mapping V=TV which 1169 
is applied to the next iteration, if the convergence of sequential estimates of V(x) to a stable 1170 
value has not been achieved. 1171 
iii) Verify if the difference|𝑇𝑉 − 𝑉| < 𝜀, where 𝜀 𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙   1172 
 If yes – then the infinite-horizon value function that defines the Bellman equation has 1173 
been found 1174 
 If not, then we return to the step ii) and repeat the procedure until the condition described 1175 
in iii) has been satisfied 1176 
In this approach, we rely upon the "contraction mapping theorem" to guarantee convergence 1177 
to a stable value of V(x) for any initial guess. 1178 
 1179 
B. Information on the data and the calibration of the farm model  1180 
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B1. Farm model data 1182 
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Table B1: Farm production model data 
  Crops  
African eggplant Eggplant Carrot Sweet pepper Tomato Cabbage Onion 
Cultivated area (ha) Mean 0.41 0.4 0.58 0.27 0.46 0.46 0.73 
Median 0.25 0.25 0.36 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 
Yields (kg/ha) Mean 10833 18045 12105 10010 10478 9948 10566 
Median 7040 16000 9933 6100 6560 7178 9333 
Crop prices (Fcfa /kg) Mean 243.64 117 115.01 489.59 121 148.91 239.31 
Median 200 111.11 101.72 300 97.56 113.2 235 
Seeds (kg /ha) Mean 0.22 0.26527 2.74789 0.19836 0.25559 0.56213 2.21061 
Median 0.250 0.300 3.460 0.200 0.300 0.650 2.614 
Seed cost (Fcfa /kg) Mean 108001 119001 23000 252001 230001 158000 55001 
Median 100000 100000 24000 209000 160000 145001 58000 
Mineral fertilizer (urea) 
(kg /ha) 
Mean 278.60 501.67 203.29 266.94 148.05 290.73 191.98 
Median 120.92 248.25 84.96 180.03 109.42 108.51 95.38 
Urea cost (Fcfa /kg) Mean 289.54 
Median 280 
Mineral fertilizer 
(10.10.20) (kg /ha) 
Mean 355.59 437.1 8 268.46 266.039 207.90 283.74 246.27 
Median 195.28 372.38 118.94 180.03 109.42 108.51 136.26 
Unit cost of 10.10.20 
(Fcfa /kg) 
Mean 273.16 
Median 250 
Organic fertilizer (kg /ha) Mean 3267 4003 4399 2044 2776 1744 2394 
Median 1292 1241 1639 1216 1055 1046 1362 
Organic fertilizer cost 
(Fcfa /kg) 
Mean 33.67 
Median 31.10 
Herbicides  (l/ha) Mean 3.66 
Median 2.72 
Herbicides Cost (Fcfa/l) Mean 8002 
Median 8000 
Seasonal labor cost  Mean 138349 
Source: Authors 
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Table B2 : Additional parameters and data for the farm model 
 Parameter Value Source 
 Soil residual water 100mm Fall (2012) 
Farm model right 
hand side value of 
constraints 
Total area cultivated (A) 3.31ha  
Totalfamilylabor 21 person/season Our data 
Totalpaidlabor 6.21 person/season Our data 
 
Table B3: Data from literature and research centers to calculate crop water use  
Crops Crop water requirements 
--ETm (m3/ha) 
Maximum Yields 
(𝒚𝒎)--(kg/ha) 
Yield response to 
water (𝒌𝒚) 
African eggplant 11258 50000 1,37 
Eggplant 11258 50000 1,37 
Carrot 16500 35000 0,82 
Sweet pepper 12010 50000 1,1 
Tomato 4515 50000 1,05 
Cabbage 6072 40000 0,95 
Onion 7032 35000 1,1 
Data source: Crop water requirements (from Senegal’s Center for the Development of Horticulture (CDH)) ; 
Maximum yields (from PADEN website17, we assumed a threshold of 50000 for the remaining crops due to lack 
of offically updated data). Yield response to water (from Doorenbos and Kassam (1979) for all crops except 
carrot from Carvalho et al. (2016) and eggplants from Lovelli et al. (2007)).  
 
B2. Calibration results 
 
Figure B1: PMP calibration results (area) 
Source: Authors 
 
                                                 
17 PADEN is a project for the development of the Niayes region. It is a project of the Ministry of Agriculture 
(2013), see: http://www.paden-senegal.org. 
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Figure B2: Calibration results (yields) 
Source: Authors 
 
B3. Hydroeconomic model data  
Table B4: Parameter values for the hydro-economic models 
Parameter Value Data source 
Infiltration rate 0.4% Tine (2004) 
Elasticity of the demand function  -0.442 Our farm model 
Constant of the demand function  8196.4 Our farm model 
Discount rate 7.5% CNCAS 
Specific yield 0.15 Dasylva and Cosandey (2005)  
Total irrigated area in the Niayes 10000 ha Faye et al. (2007) 
Aquifer lift 7m Sample data 
Water extraction from non-ag (water company and 
rural boreholes sector) 
1374495m3 Ministry of hydraulics and sanitation and 
the Senegalese water company  
Area covered by the quaternary sand aquifer 2300 km2 Aguiar et al. (2010) 
  
Source: Authors with data from literature 
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C. Historical and simulated rainfalls: a comparison 
Table C1: Simulated rainfalls 
Years Rainfalls in base 
scenario (mm) 
Rainfalls in dry scenario 
(mm) 
Rainfalls in wet scenario (mm) 
1 163.3 209.225 462.35 
2 389.325 163.3 569.725 
3 318.05 209.225 479.925 
4 479.925 209.225 569.725 
5 259.85 166.225 471.65 
6 192.325 209.225 569.725 
7 318.05 163.3 439.975 
8 458.95 166.225 569.725 
9 439.975 182.725 458.95 
10 386.275 192.325 479.925     
Mean (mm) 340.6 187.1 507.17 
Coefficient of 
variation 
0.322 0.112 0.108 
Source: Authors 
 
 
Figure C1: Simulated rainfalls vs. Observed rainfalls  
Source: Authors 
 
Table C2: Comparison of statistical characteristics of observed and simulated rainfall series  
Rainfall time series Mean (mm/year) Coefficient of variation 
Simulated rainfalls (42 years from 2012) 333.10 0.31 
Observed rainfalls (1970-2011) 337.55 0.27 
Source : Authors 
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